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ABOUT THE RECONSTITUTING LOCAL ORDERS PROJECT
Led by Brookings Senior Fellows Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shadi Hamid, and Harold Trinkunas, 
the Brookings Seminar on Reconstituting Local Orders seeks to better understand how do-
mestic political order breaks down and is reconstituted. It draws out policy implications and 
recommends more effective action for local governments and the international community. 
It examines these issues by bringing together top-level experts and policymakers.
The present disorder in the international system is significantly augmented by the break-
down of domestic order across a number of key states. Around the globe, the politics of iden-
tity, ideology and religion are producing highly polarized societies and deepening conflicts 
among non-state actors and between non-state actors and the state. In the Middle East, the 
Arab Spring disrupted long calcified political systems in ways that are still producing unpre-
dictable effects on the regional order. The collapse of political order in Libya has wide-rang-
ing consequences for governance across the Sahel, intensifying Mali and Nigeria’s fragility 
and highlighting the many deficiencies of their states. Meanwhile, Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea was facilitated by a breakdown of political order in Ukraine, and Russia’s aggres-
sive external posture also partially reflects and compensates for its internal weaknesses. But 
even emerging powers such as India and Brazil face profound and persistent governance 
problems, including in public safety and the rule of law. Among the topics explored in the 
Seminar are the construction of institutions and counter-institutions in the Middle East and 
South Asia; the role of external interveners and local militias in conflict settings; and forms 
of governance in slums and prisons, such as by criminal groups.
The Seminar is a collaborative research space that serves as a launching pad for cutting edge 
debate and research around questions of local and transnational order. The core of the an-
alytical and policy-prescriptive exploration focuses on how political and social orders are 
reconstituted, the resulting impact on regional order and the international system, and what 
roles the international community should play. Among the products of the Seminar are ana-
lytical and policy papers as well as shorter articles and blog posts that examine cross-regional 
comparisons and identify policy implications and recommendations.
Introduction
In this paper, four brief case studies are used to examine specific pat-terns of non-state social order (also known as “local orders”)—tribal, 
Islamic, mafia-based, and so on—and the challenges that they pose for 
international and, specifically, Western engagements in South Asian gov-
ernance and security. Non-state social orders that depart from Western 
policy priorities are notoriously difficult to change. In order to work more 
effectively within them, policy makers require high-level “translation” 
skills—skills that allow them to manage the tensions between seemingly 
divergent normative and political traditions. 
The first two case studies describe local orders in India and Pakistan. Each 
draws attention to a relatively stable mafia or protection racket affecting 
local property relations, and each concludes with an account of gover-
nance and security-related concerns, asking how the international com-
munity might intervene. For those with an interest in the well-being of 
marginalized groups (e.g. women and the urban poor), the answers are far 
from obvious. In India, efforts to address the immediate interests of the 
urban poor occasionally involve stepping away from the rule of law. But 
in Pakistan, efforts to protect the property rights of Muslim women may 
involve a push to enforce Islamic law.
The second two cases move away from a limited account of local orders 
to consider efforts on the part of international actors to “translate” West-
ern norms in Bangladesh and Afghanistan. Both cases describe patterns 
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of translation between Western norms and local orders with broadly un-
expected consequences. In Bangladesh, European Union (EU) officials 
seeking to promote “the rule of law” discovered that the meaning of this 
phrase was transformed as it travelled from Brussels, via elite NGOs, to 
local villagers. In Afghanistan, an American NGO working with local mul-
lahs found that its (successful) efforts to translate women’s rights into local 
articulations of shariah were dismissed by key donors in Washington.
Together, these four case studies suggest that nuanced patterns of engage-
ment with local orders are not impossible, but across South Asia the polit-
ical dynamics underpinning such engagements are complex. The challenge 
does not lie in replacing local orders with a monolithic appreciation for 
state power; the challenge lies in developing the area-specific knowledge 
required to operate within local orders while, at the same time, appreciat-
ing the delicate balance—indeed, the difficult trade-offs—between them.
Local Orders: How Might the International Community 
Intervene?
Urban Poor / Rule of Law / India
The first case study draws on the concept of “political society” developed 
by Partha Chatterjee following several years of fieldwork in Kolkata.1 This 
concept describes a pattern of local politics in urban slums—a pattern in 
which slum residents occupying land illegally draw on their substantial 
numbers to elect representatives who promise to suspend the enforcement 
of local property laws. 
Ordinarily, representatives are elected to amend existing laws in ways that 
suit their constituents. But the representatives Chatterjee describes do not 
amend local laws. Instead, they cultivate a form of electoral accountability 
in which, every few years, votes are exchanged for extra-legal and, thus, 
relatively arbitrary patterns of statutory non-enforcement. As the demo-
graphic profile of the slum changes, so too does the profile of those who 
benefit from this local order. In fact, the underlying pattern of electoral ac-
countability works two ways: winning groups secure a greater measure of 
impunity; losing groups are faced with the enforcement of unpalatable laws.
1 Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed (New York, NY: Columbia, 2004). 
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In Kolkata, Chatterjee presents this pattern of electoral exchange as a ro-
bust and enduring protection racket involving protection from the en-
forcement of existing laws. He does not describe this racket as a purely 
transactional arrangement. Instead, he describes it as a moral relationship 
connecting politicians to local voters—a relationship allowing for the very 
survival of certain local residents. Here, patronage is not limited to the for-
mal distribution of positive goods such as electricity, education, and water. 
Instead it is tied to the informal distribution of privileged access to (surviv-
al-enhancing) impunity.
Chatterjee distinguishes political society from an elite-oriented civil so-
ciety in which voters and their lobbyists press for the redrafting (and en-
forcement) of specific statutory laws. Within “political society,” he notes, 
constitutionalism gives way to particular forms of popular sovereignty: in 
political society, protection rackets are popular. Political society, he writes, 
allows “the arbitrary power of government to mitigate the … tyrannical 
power of the law.”2
Of course the stability of political society is a matter of debate, particular-
ly insofar as its informally negotiated arrangements tend to disregard the 
group-based neutrality associated with public goods. Moreover, these ar-
rangements are (by definition) revocable—periodic bulldozing to accom-
modate payments from rich developers are not uncommon, generating 
considerable uncertainty and, occasionally, violence. 
In this sense, Kolkata resembles Mumbai. In Mumbai, Marathi sons-of-
the-soil work with the police to contain the expanding influence of (non-
Marathi) rural-to-urban migrants. But in some parts of the city Marathi 
residents also collude with mafias. In fact, with reference to Marathi parties 
like Shiv Sena, it is often difficult to distinguish the work of the police from 
that of land-grabbing mafias. It is difficult to distinguish them because, in 
political society, both are expected to use their violence selectively. Both 
are expected to protect their supporters (and only their supporters)—a 
pattern that breeds instability by accelerating the privatization of violence.3 
2 Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed, 17. 
3  In Karachi, one is reminded of Sindhi concerns regarding Muhajir migrants (and Muhajir concerns 
regarding Pashtun migrants). This is, in fact, the ethnic swamp in which Tehreek-e-Taliban 
mafias have also begun to swim. Last year, Army Rangers were deployed to drain this swamp. 
But one wonders: will the arrival of Pakistan’s (mostly Punjabi) Rangers exacerbate the violence 
underpinning Karachi’s ethnicized “local orders”? 
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Typically, international actors seeking to enhance the well-being of India’s 
poor opt for one of two approaches. Those who oppose the exclusionary 
upper-caste middle-class Hindu nationalism of Shiv Sena (or the BJP) seek 
to shore up the welfarist orientation of Indian legislation and, then, pro-
vide for the enforcement of that legislation. Those who oppose the diri-
gisme of the Indian National Congress argue that economic opportunities 
(e.g. jobs) will flow from the enforcement of neoliberal property laws. 
Pointing to an already-existing alternative rooted in India’s “local order,” 
however, Partha Chatterjee illuminates a third option more commonly 
associated with the selective-enforcement politics of former Bihar Chief 
Minister Lalu Yadav. In fact, Chatterjee does not limit his account to Kol-
kata, Mumbai, or Bihar. He claims to describe a richer form of electoral 
accountability and “democracy” in several different parts of the world.4 
The question is: what might it mean for international actors to support 
this alternative form of democracy? Are international actors seeking to 
advance the well-being of India’s poor, reinforce existing forms of state au-
thority, and engage local orders prepared to shore up state officials engaged 
in subverting the rule of law? Perhaps, but in general probably not.
Muslim Women / Rule of Law / Pakistan
Turning to Pakistan, important parts of Chatterjee’s argument resurface 
whenever one encounters the notion that Islamic law is unchangeable or 
historically immune to ongoing forms of renegotiation. In fact, my own 
research regarding the production of local orders has examined the ways in 
which, notwithstanding considerable evidence of important modifications 
over time, this sense of historical immutability has become bound up with 
a set of political practices in which elected representatives are called upon, 
not to amend the ostensibly immutable terms of “statutory shariah” (that 
is, state-based forms of Islamic law) but, rather, to avoid their consistent 
enforcement.5 
4  Partha Chatterjee, Lineages of Political Society, (New York, NY: Columbia , 2011), 15. See also James 
Holston on favela-based mafias in Latin America or Jean and John L. Comaroff on “alternative” 
forms of democracy in Southern Africa: James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of 
Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2009); and John Comaroff, “Postcolonial 
Politics and Discourses of Democracy in Southern Africa: An Anthropological Reflection on 
African Political Modernities,” Journal of Anthropological Research 43, no. 2 (1997): 123-46.
5  Matthew J. Nelson, In the Shadow of Shari‘ah: Islam, Islamic Law, and Democracy in Pakistan (New 
York, NY: Columbia 2011).
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In Pakistan, these Chatterjee-style political practices often emerge with 
reference to Islamic laws concerning property and, more specifically, Is-
lamic laws of inheritance first spelled out in the Qur’an (verses 4:11, 12, 
176) and then in statutory laws: 1948, 1951, 1961, 1963, and so on. These 
laws assign specific Qur’anic shares to women (leaving the remainder of 
each estate to men). But, precisely insofar as this is the case, these laws also 
encourage those with an attachment to all-male estates—that is, an attach-
ment to patrilineal tribal customs long reinforced by the colonial state—to 
avoid the regular enforcement of Pakistan’s postcolonial laws. 
Islamic law does not deny women’s inheritance rights. It specifies those rights 
very clearly. But, with its focus on female inheritance, many landowners fear 
that Islamic law will shatter Pakistan’s customary ancestral estates—estates 
within which women are customarily disinherited precisely insofar as they 
are expected to leave their home villages when they marry. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely this clash between (customary) marriage patterns and (Islamic) inher-
itance that worries Muslim men—men who reject the notion that women 
should be allowed to carry their land away when they marry.
In fact, turning to the development of complex local orders, the primary 
challenge for many politicians does not lie in modifying the country’s os-
tensibly sacred Islamic laws. Instead it lies in addressing the well-founded 
concerns of landowning clans seeking to balance the country’s Islamic laws 
with the exigencies of tribal custom. 
Within Pakistani district courts, many disputes pit the representatives of 
“customary” tribal clans against adversaries attempting to claim their Is-
lamic rights. Unfortunately, few expect to resolve their disputes in court. 
Typically, landowning clans with strong political connections (owing to 
the power of clan-based voting blocs) call on an array of state officials to 
bleed their opponents with administrative hassles and courtroom delays 
until a custom-friendly compromise can be extracted outside of the courts. 
The courts are just one small part of a much larger protection racket in 
which, à la Chatterjee, electoral support is tied to patterns of protection 
from the enforcement of existing laws.
Of course this pattern of informal justice is a source of considerable frustra-
tion, driving many rural families into cities and many city dwellers abroad. 
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(According to one report, it was a family property dispute that drove the 
family of San Bernardino killer Tashfeen Malik away from Pakistan to Sau-
di Arabia.6) Indeed, this climate of extra-legality surrounding local prop-
erty disputes also supports politically well-connected mafias, including a 
mafia led by former National Assembly Member Shah Abdul Aziz, which 
rose to prominence following the expansion of a militant mosque in Islam-
abad known as the Lal Masjid. (A military assault on this mosque in 2007 is 
widely believed to have prompted the formation of the Pakistani Taliban.)
International actors seeking to enhance the well-being of Muslim women 
rarely focus on the value of enforcing Islamic law. Those with an interest 
in Pakistani security rarely focus on mundane property disputes. But, as 
Taliban militants begin to form their own shariah courts, highlighting the 
extent to which Pakistan’s state courts have ignored the enforcement of sha-
riah, perhaps these international actors will reconsider. Perhaps they will 
reassess their understanding of the interaction between Islamic law and 
routine property disputes.7 
Armed with a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s local orders, those with 
an interest in supporting marginalized groups (for example, Muslim wom-
en) need not shy away from the enforcement of existing law; in some cas-
es, they may be advised to press for the enforcement of Islamic laws. Are 
Western actors prepared to do this? Perhaps, but in general probably not.
Local Orders: What Happens When the International 
Community Intervenes?
My final two cases move away from a limited account of local orders to 
consider broadly related efforts to “translate” Western norms into local idi-
oms. Focusing on Western efforts to promote the rule of law in Bangladesh 
and gender justice in Afghanistan, I ask, “What happens to international 
actors when they engage local orders and try to work within them?” 
6  Declan Walsh  “Tashfeen Malik Was a ‘Saudi Girl’ Who Stood Out at a Pakistani University,” New 
York Times, December 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/world/asia/in-conservative-
pakistani-city-a-saudi-girl-who-stood-out.html?_r=0. 
7 Nelson, In the Shadow of Shari‘ah. 
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European Union / Local NGOs / Bangladesh
My third case grows out of a doctoral dissertation written by Tobias Berger 
at the Free University in Berlin.8 Berger examined EU-funded rule-of-law 
programming in Bangladesh, focusing on how some of the the meanings 
attached to rule-of-law norms were transformed as they travelled from 
Brussels, via Dhaka-based NGOs, to rural villages. 
Typically, scholars with an interest in norm diffusion focus on the role of 
global advocacy networks, paying little attention to the ways in which such 
networks, working in new social contexts, reshape the meanings of norms 
themselves.9 In Berger’s thesis, however, the interconnectedness of interna-
tional vocabularies—everyone refers to “the rule of law”—is not confused 
with any type of normative assimilation. Instead, Berger examines the ways 
in which local actors function as brokers or translators—translators who 
transform the meaning of a common phrase. 
In Brussels, Berger notes that the rule of law was tied to a particular sense 
of “legal equality,” i.e. equality before the law (whatever that law might be). 
But in Dhaka, this phrase was taken up by elite staff members working for 
a prominent English-speaking NGO and refashioned as a vector for ideas 
about social equality: what many NGO workers described as the pursuit of 
“social justice”. In the hands of Western-funded NGOs, in other words, the 
rule of law became an instrument of change for the poor.
Finally, however, when the rule of law came into contact with local vil-
lagers, it was re-read (once again) as a template for “community harmo-
ny”: typically, forms of harmony that preserved the economic, religious, 
or caste-based power of certain male elites. Prominent villagers, in other 
words, claimed to embrace “the rule of law,” but the meaning of that norm 
was different.
Returning from their fieldwork, each NGO worker was required to com-
plete a set of program evaluation forms for their bosses in Dhaka and Brus-
sels. Within these forms, most NGO workers noted that, after attending a 
8  Tobias Berger, “Global Norms and Local Courts: Translating the Rule of Law in Rural Bangladesh” 
(PhD thesis, Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies, 2014); this thesis was jointly supervised 
by Professor Thomas Risse and myself (Free University of Berlin). 
9  Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1998).
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series of training sessions, many villagers expressed high levels of satis-
faction with “the rule of law.” Indeed, sweeping claims regarding the local 
benefits of EU funding soon began to proliferate.
With reference to the family property disputes that lay behind so many 
village-level conflicts Berger reports that, as a result of program interven-
tions, many women did in fact gain access to documents they could present 
in court. In court, they rarely managed to secure an enforceable judgment. 
But, as in Pakistan, they did manage to secure an informal compromise 
outside of the courts themselves. In Pakistan, such compromises tended 
to privilege the terms of tribal custom. But, in Bangladesh, these compro-
mises were somewhat more in keeping with state-based laws guaranteeing 
Muslim women access to their Islamic inheritance rights. 
This turn to female-friendly agreements (based on Islamic law) rendered 
outside of the district courts was not the “legal equality” initially envisioned 
in Brussels. But, empirically speaking, it was a different outcome than the 
one prevailing before. EU funding made a difference—a difference that ad-
justed without fully displacing a complex rural order. This outcome was 
not rooted in the secular ideals of elite civil society or the formal checks 
and balances of an established parliamentary democracy. It was, rather, an 
EU-funded outcome rooted in the fabric of rural Bangladesh. 
If international actors in Brussels were to focus on this process of “transla-
tion,” one wonders what they might say. Would they be inclined to increase 
their funding for a program enhancing women’s access to extrajudicial 
compromises and Islamic social norms? Perhaps, but again probably not. 
American NGOs / Local Mullahs / Afghanistan
My final case study grows out of a project undertaken by a prominent 
American NGO working in Afghanistan. This project engaged hundreds 
of Afghan mullahs to access local communities and, then, leveraged that 
access for the advancement of women’s rights. 
The NGO understood that, over the years, its habit of working with secular 
human rights organizations had brought it into contact with a smaller and 
smaller portion of the Afghan population. It resolved to reverse this trend, 
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preparing a list of established local mullahs committed to improving the 
well-being of Afghan women. 
The problem lay in deciding whether this American NGO should attempt 
to access the mullahs’ extensive grassroots networks without, at the same 
time, ceding control over the language of women’s rights. Would something 
central to their mission be lost, they wondered, if their religious partners 
sought to describe discriminatory customs as a “sin”? Would their core 
commitments be compromised if, in a bid to cultivate an appreciation for 
women’s rights, some villagers were accused of forsaking or insulting Is-
lam? Given existing tensions between religious, tribal, and Western norms, 
they were reluctant to stir up a fight.
Eventually, the organization convinced itself that its core values did not 
conflict with those of its religious partners—that, notwithstanding certain 
forms of gendered differentiation, there was nothing in the Qur’anic lan-
guage preferred by local mullahs that automatically cut against the basic 
issues that concerned them: girl’s education, women’s employment, access 
to justice, and so on. In the end, they simply resolved to translate their val-
ues into a more persuasive religious idiom. 
For the American NGO, the price of local access was not defined in terms 
of core program objectives. Like those who opted to work with Taliban 
commanders to reduce opium production during the 1990s, the NGO ap-
preciated the ways in which respected mullahs used religious references 
to challenge local patterns that concerned them. Still, there was a price to 
pay, and that price was paid in terms of discursive control. Those working 
for the NGO believed that this was a reasonable price to pay. But, closer to 
home, many of their donors disagreed. 
In Washington, London, Ottawa, and Canberra, crucial donors tied to 
skeptical Western voters worried that Afghan mullahs were not the best 
partners for a program focusing on women’s rights. Indeed, even as these 
concerns took shape in Washington, the NGO faced similar concerns from 
Afghan religious leaders who felt that foreign organizations should not use 
Afghan mullahs to reshape traditional norms. Briefly, the NGO found it-
self on the horns of a dilemma: access to Afghan villagers versus access to 
program funds. 
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This was not an unfamiliar dilemma. In fact this is a dilemma that emerges 
whenever foreigners engage “Islamic” orders abroad. But it also emerges 
in the West, as the Archbishop of Canterbury discovered when he claimed 
that informal shariah tribunals might have a role to play in providing ac-
cess to justice for British Muslims.10 Once again, well-informed Western 
efforts to engage Muslim communities via the terms of shariah were seen 
as politically divisive.
Conclusion
Recalling Isaiah Berlin’s heuristic distinction between hedgehogs, who fa-
vor only one normative order, and foxes, who value several different orders 
simultaneously, scholars and policy makers with an interest in engaging 
local orders are required to think like foxes.11 Following Max Weber’s dis-
tinction between the “charismatic” authority of religious elites, the “cus-
tomary” authority of tribal jirgas, and the “rational” authority of state 
courts—without any sense of priority—those seeking new ways to engage 
local orders require a deep appreciation for all three while, at the same 
time, realizing that any effort to stress just one will produce a correspond-
ing reaction in the others.12 
Nuanced forms of international engagement with local orders are not im-
possible; but, across South Asia, the political dynamics underpinning such 
engagements are complex. Augmenting the influence of tribal elites by de-
nying Muslim women their Qur’anic inheritance may lead local mullahs 
working with marginalized groups to press for the restoration of shariah. 
Similarly, augmenting the power of existing states by enforcing women’s 
rights could lead “custom-friendly” elites to explore informal alternatives. 
The challenge for international actors does not lie in eradicating irksome 
local orders or subsuming them within monolithic forms of state pow-
10  “Sharia Law in UK Is ‘Unavoidable,’” BBC, February 7, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk/7232661.stm.
11  Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton, 2013).
12  Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Roth and Wittich,  (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 
1978).
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er. The challenge lies in developing the sort of area-specific knowledge 
required to operate within local orders while appreciating the trade-offs 
between them. 
Over-centralization has a tendency to produce specific forms of resistance. 
But the creation of bright boundaries between alternative orders often has 
a similar effect. Blurry boundaries are normal. The challenge lies in locat-
ing a skilled cadre of “translators” to toggle across these boundaries. These 
are the actors who construct the modi vivendi that allow Western actors to 
understand and engage local orders in complex environments like South 
Asia. These are the actors who redefine, in order to advance, the goals we 
aim to achieve.
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